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Introduction
The desire to describe and understand the expression of empathy
and its importance in interpersonal relationships is nothing new to
those who ponder over the human condition. Stewart (1956) traced
the concept of empathy from Plato, who, in his seventh letter, wrote
that the kinship of insight or empathy is the highest form of know-
ledge, being at once the ground and goal of the Ideas. Philosopher
Max Scheler (1928/1970) argued that the emotional experience of
"fellow-feeling" is a necessary component for truly personal relation-
ships.
More contemporary investigators have also focused upon empathy,
but particularly upon the importance of empathy in the development
and expression of prosocial behaviors. Not unlike many other areas
of research, each investigator appears to have his or her own defi-
nition of the basic concept; as might be expected, different defini-
tions often lead to different methodologies which, in turn, lead to
different results.
Two views of empathy
Hoffman (1975a, 1976, 1977a, 1977b) points out that there are
two broad conceptions of empathy, and it will be useful to follow
his classification system to understand the perspectives of the re-
searchers to be discussed later in this paper. The first approach
conceives of empathy as an awareness or knowledge of the feelings of
another person. This is a purely cognitive process of understanding
what the other person is feeling.
The second conception of empathy emphasizes the vicarious affec-
tive response a person may experience when exposed to another person's
feelings. Hoffman notes that this second definition is closer to
what is commonly meant by the word empathy and has been the conception
held by most social philosophers throughout a long history of thought
and speculation. It seems important to note that, while this is an
emotional experience, a cognitive process of "Wiling the emotion
must surely be employed. The affective view of empathy, then, is
assumed to include both cognitive and affective components.
The difference between the cognitive and affective views is
amplified by Feshbach and Roe (1968) who state that, "Empathy as a
vicarious affective response may be contingent upon the comprehension
of a social event, while social understanding may be independent of
an affective response" (p. 133). The cognitive approach emphasizes
the accurate recognition of the emotions of another. It is the ob-
server's interpretation of the other's affective state without a
similar affective state necessarily being aroused in the observer.
As such, it probably would have little theoretical value for the
empathy-altruism relationship except as a cue for an observer that
an altruistic act may be appropriate (Feshbach, 1978a). Thus, cogni-
tive empathy gives the actor the information necessary for determining
that an altruistic act is required, based upon the perception of
another's distress. Emotional empathy is believed to be more relevant
for altruism research, however, because it provides a potential moti-
vation for action. The empathic arousal felt by an individual could
theoretically impell that person to go to the victim's aid. As we
shall see, the literature on altruism is in need of some such motiva-
tional construct.
Definitions of altruism
Like empathy, no universally accepted definition of prosocial
behavior, or altruism, can be found. Altruism is frequently the
label given to such actions as helping or sharing which benefit
another at some cost to the actor, with the stipulation that the
acts are performed without motivation for personal gain by the actor.
Unfortunately, to demonstrate "true" altruism the researcher would
be required to show that the actor was not motivated by any desire
which could, if fulfilled, lead to a reward or gratification for the
actor. This, of course, places an impossible task upon the shoulders
of the social scientist because it necessitates a proof of the null
hypothesis (Bryan, 1975; Krebs, 1970).
Other definitions of altruism have attempted to circumvent this
problem by rephrasing to avoid motivational issues. Another definition,
coined by Macaulay and Berkowitz (1970), conceives of altruism as
"behavior carried out to benefit another without anticipation of re-
wards from external sources" (p. 3). This definition does not avoid
the null hypothesis problem since the person might be motivated to
help someone purely to gain a sense of satisfaction from having helped,
but the definition explicitly rules out the anticipation of external
rewards as a motivation. Bryan and London (1970) further qualify
the description of altruistic behaviors by stating that such behaviors
are "intended to benefit the other but which appear to have a high cost
to the actor with little possibility of material or social rewards"
(p. 200).
The forementioned definitions are still cumbersome and thus most
researchers employ narrower operational definitions which allow them
to ignore the intention problem, and assume that behavior which seems
intuitively altruistic is in fact altruism (Rushton, 1976). This
poses a serious problem to those interested in finding the sources
of prosocial behavior since generally it is the intention behind the
action which determines the moral worth of that action. It would
appear vital that a motivational component, however difficult to deal
with experimentally, be incorporated in any comprehensive view of
prosocial behavior.
Empathy as a_ motivational construct in altruism
The conception of empathy as a vicarious affective response to
another's feelings and needs may serve to provide a motivational
explanation for prosocial behavior. If an individual's distress
arouses a similar feeling in an empathic observer, that observer may
be motivated to help to a greater extent than would another person
lacking a capacity for empathy. The empathy-helping scenerio might
unfold in the following manner: (a) the person in need of help emits
cues as to his or her affective state, (b) the empathic individual
senses the other's distress, (e) this elicits a similar affect in
the observer, and (d) the empathic arousal is translated into appro-
priate action.
This little episode includes at least three implicit assumptions.
First, there is the assumption that affect can influence and/or
motivate prosocial behavior. This appears to be a plausible assump-
tion since the influence of affect on altruism is fairly well estab-
lished (e.g., Harris & Siebel, 1975; Isen, 1970; Moore, Underwood, &
Rosenhan, 1973; Rosenhan, Underwood, & Moore, 1974; Staub, 1974),
The majority of the studies cited indicate that negative affect will
suppress altruism; since the empathic distress aroused by observing
someone in distress is presumably experienced as negative affect,
this pattern of findings appears problematic. Negative affect has
been induced in subjects primarily by having the subjects either dis-
cuss and dwell upon negative personal experiences or by giving the
subjects a failure experience. These techniques would tend to make
one feel sad about oneself. However, there is additional evidence
that there may be particular types of negative affect, such as guilt
or empathy, which are qualitatively different from simply feeling
unhappy about oneself and which may serve to increase helping (Hoffman,
1975a; Staub, 1974). In a recent study (Barnett, King, & Howard, 1979),
second- to fourth-grade children were asked to recall and dwell upon
either sad personal experiences or the sad experiences of another
individual. The children were subsequently given an opportunity to
share their experimental earnings with needy children. It was found
that those children who felt badly about another's misfortune, which
presumably elicited empathic arousal, shared significantly more prizes
than did children who felt sad about personal misfortunes. Therefore,
empathy for another's plight is expected to enhance the expression of
prosocial behaviors since the attention of the empathic observer is
directed to vicariously shared feelings rather than solely upon the
individual's own feelings.
The second implicit assumption is that the person will want to
relieve the other's distress. Research with adults indicates that
the intensity of the affect and the speed of the overt response in-
crease as the number and intensity of the distress cues from the vic-
tim increase (Geer & Jarmecky, 1973; Weiss, Boyer, Lombardo, & Stich,
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1973) . This is not to deny that there may be other factors which will
prevent the person from actually helping even if there is a high af-
fective arousal. In many cases, the personal cost may be too great
in terms of fear or danger of a physical or social risk involved in
the act of helping (Staub, 1974). There may be. an inhibiting "diffu-
sion of responsibility" factor when a person is a member of a crowd
of bystanders (Latane & Darley, 1970). The person may doubt his
or her ability to provide the necessary aid to the victim (Lenrow,
1965). Finally, there may be other overriding egoistic concerns such
as those which may result from competition (Barnett & Bryan, 1974).
However, given a situation relatively devoid of these conflicting
motives and factors, attempts to help are expected to be enhanced under
conditions of empathic arousal.
The third assumption is that the cognitive ability and past ex-
perience of the individual will serve to translate the emotional arousal
into appropriate action. By and large, adults translate their emotions
into action without extreme difficulty. Young children, however, may
not have a behavioral repertoire sophisticated enough to act appro-
priately in the face of an empathic arousal to another's distress. For
example, they may simply cry in response to another child's cry for
help (Hoffman, 1975a).
Conceiving of empathy as a possible motivating force for altruism
may offer an important compromise to the earlier "egoistic" critique
of the altruism research: by aiding the other, one would reduce one's
own empathic distress while simultaneously reducing the distress of
the other. However, Hoffman (1977a) argues that an act of giving aid
may occasionally be attempted when such effort actually increases the
empathic distress of the actor. For example, nurses working with
terminally ill patients could reduce their own empathic distress by
leaving the room but instead they stay to aid the patient. While the
"pure versus egoistic altruism" argument can rage on and on depending
upon one's theoretical approach to such issues, it is perhaps most
fruitful to regard empathy as something having the potential to spur
people into prosocial action which benefits another, and accept that
the private intentions of the individual may never be unambiguously
determined.
A theoretical blending of the notions of empathy and altruism
is seen in the writing of Justin Aronfreed (1968, 1970) who states that:
A concept of altruism must focus on a component of be-
havioral control that is directed to effects which will be
produced in the experience of another person. Regardless of
whether such effects are directly observable or are given a
cognitive representation by the actor, the altruistic com-
ponent of their affective value must be transmitted by the
actor's empathic or vicarious experience. Empathic or vi-
carious control is the criterion of the truely altruistic
act. (1970, p. 105)
Thus Aronfreed defines altruism in terms of the presence or absence
of an empathic or vicarious affective experience on the part of the
actor. While this definition of altruism has been criticized as
being unnecessarily narrow (Macaulay & Berkowitz, 1970), it points
the way toward a theory of altruism which assumes that the actor
responds emotionally to the perceived need of another and is motivated
by that experience of empathy.
•
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To summarize, then, empathy can be considered as either cogni-
tive, affective, or both. While both components are undoubtably
important, the vicarious experiencing of another individual's affect
seems to be the more crucial aspect for altruism research by virtue
of its potential motivating power.
Empathy and helping among adults
The research with adults, utilizing a variety of different
assessment techniques, has shown a fairly consistent positive rela-
tionship between the experience of empathy and prosocial behavior.
In a study wherein college students observed a performer in distress,
Krebs (1975) found that "when required to make a choice between help-
ing themselves at a cost to the performer or helping the performer
at a cost to themselves, the subjects who reacted most empathically
behaved most altruistically" (p. 1134). Aderman and Berkowitz (1970)
manipulated the empathy of college students by instructing them to
imagine how they would feel in the place of an unfortunate student
whose plight was discussed via a tape recording. Those students who
empathized the most, as measured by a mood questionnaire, also showed
the greatest helping. Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) found that highly
empathic college students gave significantly less shock to a close
proximity "learner" in a Buss (1961) aggression paradigm; they also
found a positive relationship between empathy and helping among female
college students in a second study. In a jury simulation study, highly
empathic college students who heard a plea by the defense attorney
designed to elicit empathizing with his client judged the defendant
to be more innocent than did those who did not hear the plea which en-
couraged empathizing (Archer, Foushee, & Davis, 1977, Experiment 2).
In addition, there was a marginally significant fp < .06) tendency
for highly empathic subjects receiving the empathic appeal to report
a greater attempt to place themselves "in the defendant's position"
than less empathic subjects.
Coke, Batson, and McDavis (1978) attempted to achieve an under-
standing of the relationships among role-taking skills, empathy,
and altruism. In a series of studies with college students, they
determined that taking the perspective of another individual facili-
tates empathic arousal which, in turn, increases helping. After a
lengthy review of investigations of empathy and helping with adult
samples, Batson, Darley, and Coke (1978) concluded that there is
ample empirical support for the theoretical assertion that empathic
arousal is an important mediator of helping.
Although empathy has been found to play an important motivational
role in the adult's prosocial behavior, empathy may play a changing
role in prosocial behavior as the child matures. Since it is pre-
sumably during childhood that the link between empathy and altruism
is established, the development and expression of empathy in children
has attracted the attention of several theorists. It is to the writings
of these theorists that we now turn.
Theories of the development and expression of empathy
While the research on empathy has tended to emphasize either
cognitive or affective conceptions of empathy, an adequate developmental
approach must include both components. Norma Feshbach and Martin
Hoffman have each attempted this synthesis. After considering their
respective theoretical approaches, research on developmental and sex
differences in empathy and helping will be explored.
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Feshbach (1975) defines empathy as an emotional match between
the feelings of the observed and the observer. She proposes a three
component model of empathy which attempts to account for both the
cognitive and the affective contributions. The first two components
are cognitive: (a) the child must have the ability to discriminate
the perspective of the other person from their own, and (b) a more
advanced skill, the child must be able to discriminate the "role" of
the other from his or her own. The third requirement is that the
child must have a capacity for, and responsiveness to, emotion. Each
of these probably change as the child grows, matures, and accumulates
additional experiences relevant to the feelings of others. According
to Feshbach, all three are necessary for empathy.
Her ideas are operationalized in an empathy measure she devised
for use with young children. The Feshbach and Roe (1968) measure con-
sists of eight sets of slides, each with a short narrative. The
slides present situations in which a child is angry, happy, sad, or
afraid. After viewing each set of slides and listening to the story
which accompanies it, the child is asked by the experimenter "How do
you feel?", or "Tell me how you feel." The child's responses are
scored for accuracy in matching the affect of the target character.
In this way, the experimenter obtains a measure of the child's ability
to feel what the child in the slides is probably feeling. It is readily
apparent that the emphasis is upon the child's affective response.
This emphasis reflects Feshbach 's belief that it is the emotional
response which is most important in empathy. She states:
While empathy presupposes some degree of social under-
standing, the converse is not true. Understanding the
.
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feelings of another person does not necessarily lead to
an empathic response. Consequently, while the cognitive
dimension of empathy is important, it is the affective
component that gives the empathy construct its unique
property. (1975, p. 26)
Feshbach sees empathy as relating positively to a cluster of
prosocial behaviors and constructs such as moral judgment, and nega-
tively to antisocial behaviors and constructs such as aggression. In
this broad conceptualization we find Feshbach 's view that perceiving
and experiencing another's affect should enhance prosocial behaviors
and inhibit antisocial behaviors. For example, an empathic individual
should be less aggressive because cognitively he or she understands
the other's perspective in a potential conflict situation, and emotion-
ally he or she can anticipate feeling the pain of the other.
Following this line of reasoning, Feshbach and Feshbach (1969)
compared teacher's ratings of children's aggressiveness with each
child's performance on the Feshbach and Roe empathy measure. In
boys ages six and seven, the relationship was in the predicted direction
with highly empathic boys being less aggressive. This finding was
later replicated by Huckaby (1971). In another recent study using the
Feshbach and Roe (1968) empathy measure, highly competitive boys were
found to be significantly less empathic than less competitive boys
(Barnett, Matthews, & Howard, 1979). This provides additional support
for Feshbach 's contention that empathy is negatively related to selfish,
antisocial behaviors since competitiveness can be considered conceptually
similar to aggressiveness.
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To summarize, Feshbach's view of empathy is based upon an
affective match of observer and observed, with the emphasis on the
emotional component. Her primary measure of empathy is the self-
reported affective response to a slide/story sequence. The motiva-
tional aspect of empathy is derived from logical and empirical sup-
port for the contention that empathy is associated positively with
prosocial constructs and behaviors, and negatively with antisocial
behaviors.
Hoffman (1977a) defines empathy as "a largely involuntary
vicarious response to affective cues from another person or from his
situation" (p. 1). His model is an attempt to explain how affective,
cognitive, and motivational factors each play changing and interactive
roles in the child's empathy. Unlike most other theorists, Hoffman
takes a predominately developmental approach. By incorporating know-
ledge from other branches of child development, he builds a persuasive
argument to support a rather simple contention: empathy leads to
altruism.
Hoffman identifies five modes of empathic affect arousal. Although
the five modes are arranged in order from simple to complex, they
are not intended to form a strict developmental or stage sequence.
The first two modes operate in early infancy before the child is able
to cognitively distinguish him/herself from the world. The remaining
three supersede the first two and continue to function throughout life
and may operate simultaneously in any given situation. The modes are
not given names, only descriptions. The following is a close para-
phrasing of Hoffman's (1977a) explanation of his theoretical model.
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The first mode of empathic affect arousal is found in newborns
who will frequently cry in response to the sound of another infant's
cry. There is evidence that this early cry is not merely a reflexive
response to the annoying stimulus of the noise since the infants
do not cry as much to nonhuman noise or computer simulated infant
cries which are equally loud (Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Simner, 1971).
While this responsive cry is quite natural and intense and cannot be
considered simply an imitative vocal response, it is not a mature
empathic response since it lacks a cognitive component. Thus it is
mentioned by Hoffman only as a possible precursor of empathic arousal.
The second mode appears somewhat later as the infant develops
a greater perceptual discrimination capability. It emphasizes the
classical conditioning of affect similar to that discussed by Aron-
freed and Paskal (in Aronfreed, 1968), whose research is described
more fully on page 22. Empathy results from the feelings communicated
during the physical handling of the infant by the caretaker. In this
manner, the infant receives information about the affective state of
the caretaker, and responds in kind. If the mother is tense, she may
handle the child more rigidly than at other times. Her facial and
verbal expressions then become associated with the handling and are
conditioned to the affective state which has been passed on to the
infant. Of course, stimulus generalization to other individuals is
anticipated and the child will eventually show a simple empathic
response to the distress of others, albeit without any cognitive under-
standing of the other's situation.
The third mode is a more advanced version of the classical con-
ditioning of the earlier mode. Instead of the physical mediation
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of the caretaker, cues from another or another's situation can evoke
memories and associations with the observer's own past experiences
resulting in an empathic affective reaction. Although this mode was
intended by Hoffman to show how distress can be vicariously aroused,
this mechanism can function for both positive and negative emotional
experiences. Not only past distress and unpleasant feelings, but
also the pleasant experience of a birthday party, could be elicited
in this manner.
The fourth mode of empathic arousal is based upon Lipps' (1906)
idea that the physical expression of emotion by one person is an
adequate stimulus to elicit that emotion in the observer through an
innate process of "motor mimicry." The inner proprioceptive cues
of the motor feedback would contribute to the individual's understanding
and experiencing of the other's emotional state. Although historically
Lipps' theory has largely been ignored, Hoffman cites several studies
(see Hoffman, 1977a, for complete references cited) showing empirical
support, and so includes it as a possible source or mechanism of
affective arousal. •
The fifth and final mode of empathic affective arousal is based
upon the experimental technique of Stotland (1969) who asked college
students to imagine how they would feel if they themselves were in
the target character's situation, experiencing all of the same stimuli.
In that experiment, subjects instructed to imagine how they would feel
in the place of a target character who was observed experiencing
painful heat to the hand, gave more evidence of empathic distress,
both physiologically and verbally, than did subjects instructed to
simply imagine how the other person feels
. Cognitive processes
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obviously play a large part in this mode of affect arousal since it
is the imaginative experiencing of events which is responsible for the
emotional arousal. However, this process is important since it sug-
gests that the empathic arousal of an individual can be relatively in-
dependent of the actual situation or emotional state of the target
character.
By specifying these five modes of empathizing Hoffman is not
attempting to define five different types of empathy. Rather, he is
arguing that the experience of empathy may be modified by the develop-
ment of the child's cognitive abilities. When Hoffman writes of a
cognitive component, he is referring to a very basic ability.
The mature empathizer knows that the source of his affect
is something happening to another person, and he has a
sense of what the other person is feeling. The young
child who lacks a self-other distinction does not have
these cognitions. (Hoffman, 1977a, p. 3)
"Person permanence" is achieved by about twelve months of age and at
this point the child is aware of others as being distinct from himself.
Prior to this, the child must be unclear as to his own boundaries and
his empathy would be immature as a result. By two or three years of
age, the child knows that others have their own feelings and inner
states independent of his own. By middle childhood, the child has
developed to the point of understanding that others have personal
identities and experiences beyond the immediate situation. Because of
the fundamental role of cognition in empathy, Hoffman believes that
this developmental sequence in the maturation of cognition must alter
the very quality of the observer's empathic experience. With the aware-
ness of the other as a separate and distinct individual comes the growing,
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reciprocal feeling of concern for the other in distress. The mature
empathizer continues to respond empathically, feeling the other's
distress, but now also feels compassion or "sympathetic distress"
upon witnessing the other's suffering.
The development of sympathetic distress gives rise to the moti-
vational component of Hoffman's model of empathy. The desire to aid
another as a result of empathic arousal is not solely an egoistic
motive to reduce empathic distress, but arises from the compassion
generated along with the empathic response. The sympathic distress
felt by the empathizer changes the aim of the person, from wanting to
relieve his or her own distress, to a conscious desire to relieve the
distress perceived in the other. This, then, is a more genuine pro-
social motivation. Hoffman cites several studies (Geer & Jarmecky,
1973; Latane and Darley, 1970; Murphy, 1937; Weiss, et al., 1973)
demonstrating that individuals typically follow empathic arousal with
altruistic acts, and in the event that no act of helping is made, the
subjects report a continuation of arousal and feeling uncomfortable.
The support Hoffman musters to substantiate several features
of his model is frequently anecdotal or correlational in nature.
However, the logic of his argument, especially as it seeks to include
findings of other areas of child development, is suggestive and cer-
tainly deserves additional research.
Developmental differences in empathy
There has been a good deal of attention directed to how empathy
might change with age. In the past, many theorists have viewed empathy
as a primitive method of communication which is lost as language is
developed (Katz, 1963). Sullivan (1953) believed that empathy is a
form of communication on a nonverbal level which originates in the
17
relationship of the mother and the infant. In the infant it is most
intense, he proposed, tending to decline with maturity. Based upon
his observations, Sullivan concluded that very young infants react
empathically to the moods of the adults who care for them.
Ernest Schachtel (in Katz, 1963) blamed the proposed decline
in empathic abilities on the child's socialization. As an infant,
the child uses the "proximity senses" of taste, touch, and smell.
His or her direct participation in the environment fosters an empathic
response to those around him or her. However, as the culture gives
preference to the "distance senses" of sight and hearing, the child
gradually loses the earlier reliance upon the proximity senses and
becomes more detached and alienated from the environment. The use
of standardized symbols, conventional categories, and images inhibits
empathy until it finally atrophies.
Rather than declining developmentally, recent investigators have
found that empathy, whether defined in the cognitive or emotional
vein, increases with age. Ruderman (1961), using a pencil and paper
test of empathy, found that empathy increased from ages nine to twelve.
Iannotti (1977) found that role-taking ability, a cognitive skill
related to empathy, increased with age. Kurdek and Rodgon (1975)
found that perspective taking increases linearly from kindergarten
through the sixth grade. Emotional empathy, as measured by the Fesh-
bach and Roe (1968) procedure described earlier, has been found to
increase between the ages of three and eight years (Fay, 1970; Fesh-
bach & Feshbach, 1969; Kuchenbecher , Feshbach, & Pletcher, 1973).
The age at which a child can first empathize is of particular
importance for the cognitive-type conceptualizations of empathy. Most
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cognitive theorists tend to accept Piaget's (1950) stages of develop-
ment which state that a child younger than seven years of age is
characteristically egocentric and cannot decenter adequately to
empathize (e.g., Chandler & Greenspan, 1972). Other theorists and
researchers do not agree with the age demarcation set by the Piagetians,
Borke (1972), for example, finds preschool children have remarkable
empathic abilities. Waxier, Yarrow, and Smith (1977) found children
as young as three years of age have some perspective taking skills,
contrary to the findings of the Piagetian researchers.
Borke (1972) argues that the reason why the Piagetian cut-off
age is too high and thus overestimates the age at which empathy is
possible is that the tasks used in the research are too difficult for
the youngsters, given the simplicity of their vocabularies. Rather
than being unable to master the experimental tasks, the children are
at a loss for words. A study by Greenspan, Barenboim, and Chandler
(1976) is a clear example of how setting the task requirements too
high can bias the task against younger children. In their experiment,
children were asked to make affective judgments based upon complex
and inconsistent social cues — clearly a difficult task for a six-
year-old.
Sex differences in empathy
In their 1974 book on the psychology of sex differences, Maccoby
and Jacklin reviewed thirty studies on empathy. They concluded that
there is no consistent support for the belief that girls are more
empathic than boys, contrary to the stereotype which says they are.
This conclusion has been criticized by Hoffman (1977b) on the grounds
that proper attention was not paid to the definition of empathy
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in each of the studies reviewed. Hoffman reorganized the studies
and found that (a) in the six studies using a definition roughly
equivalent to vicarious affective arousal, the females obtained
higher scores, (b) in the studies where empathy was actually closer
to simple recognition of the other's affect, females scored higher
on two and there was no difference on the other five, and (c) in
the remaining studies reviewed, the concept investigated was closer
to social competence and the boys and girls were equally likely to
obtain higher scores. Hoffman reviewed several additional studies,
attempting to use more homogeneous classifications. Females tended
to have higher scores than the males in all sixteen of the studies
classified under vicarious affective arousal. In only three did the
difference reach statistical significance, however, although an addi-
tional four approached significance. In those studies on recognition
of affect, there was only a very slight tendency for girls to score
higher than boys. Finally, in studies of cognitive and spatial per-
spective taking, boys showed a slight tendency to outscore the girls.
Taken together, Hoffman concludes that if empathy is viewed as a
vicarious affective experience, girls tend to be consistently more
empathic than boys, although in individual studies the difference fre-
quently fails to reach statistical significance.
Research on empathy and altruism : Cognitive perspectives
As noted earlier, research directed toward understanding the
empathy-altruism relationship has tended to fall into one of two camps:
cognitive and affective. The use of a cognitive definition of empathy
has produced inconsistent findings as researchers attempt to predict
prosocial behavior. Rubin and Schneider (1973) tested seven-year-olds
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on measures of communicative egocentrism (where the less egocentric
child is considered more empathic) and moral development and then gave
the children two opportunities to be altruistic by helping and donating.
Success on the two cognitive measures was positively related to al-
truism.
Fry (1976) utilized a measure of social sensitivity which con-
sisted of a videotape presentation of two adults in happy, angry,
anxious, and sad interactions. Eleven-year-old children were asked
to describe the feelings and motives of the adults. Fry found that
social sensitivity and attitudes toward prosocial behavior were corre-
lated with altruism and self-gratification in the expected directions,
i.e., high social sensitivity and a positive attitude was predictive
of high altruism while low social sensitivity and a negative attitude
toward prosocial behavior predicted low altruism and high self-gratifi-
cation. Waxier, Yarrow, and Smith (1977) investigated the relationship
between perspective taking and altruism in three- to seven-year-olds
and found that the ability to take the other's perspective failed to
predict the prosocial measures of helping, sharing, or comforting.
Their study did demonstrate, however, that very young children do have
some ability to take the perspective of the other, a skill denied
young children by the Piagetian theorists.
Another variety of cognitive definition centers on the role-taking
abilities of the child. The question asked is whether the child has
the capacity to step into another's shoes and see the world as the
other sees it. The logic of testing role-taking skills relates to the
earlier scenerio wherein the child observes someone in distress, and,
by cognitively imagining what it would be like to experience that
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distress, is motivated to act altruistically. The empirical research
on role-taking ability utilized by most researchers is one operational-
ized by Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, and Jarvis (1968). Flavell et
al. list several separate tasks to measure role-taking skills. What
the tasks all have in common is the requirement that the child must
be able to understand that there may be a discrepancy between the in-
formation available to him/herself and information available to another
person who arrives later and is not aware of essential details in the
situation. The child's accuracy in predicting what the late arriver
will conclude based upon available information is used as an index of
the child's ability to put him/herself in the position of the other
and view the situation from another perspective. Although some of the
same role-taking measures are used in different studies, the results
vary. Iannotti (1977) utilized two of these tasks to study the role-
taking skills of seven- and ten-year-old boys and found that his corre-
lational data supported the notion that the development of role taking
is related to changes in altruism. In an earlier study, Iannotti
(1975) had given six-year-old boys training in role taking and found
that altruism was significantly greater following training. Krebs and
Sturrup (1974), using the Flavell et al. (1968) role-taking tasks,
found role- taking ability in seven- and eight-year-olds correlated
significantly (r = .46, p < .02) with a composite altruism score. In
addition, they found positive, although nonsignificant correlations
of role taking with component altruism scores and teachers' ratings of
cooperative and prosocial behaviors. There have been failures, however,
in attempts to find a reliable relationship between role taking and
helping behavior. Emler and Rushton (1974), using the Flavell et al.
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(1968) technique, failed to find a relationship between role-taking
skills and generosity. Similarly, Rushton and Wiener (1975) in a
study with seven- and eleven-year-olds "failed to find any predictive
utility for two different measures of role taking, again taken from
Flavell et al. (1968), on three different measures of altruism"
(Rushton, 1976, p. 903).
In summary, attempts to find a relationship between a cognitive,
perspective-taking view of empathy and measures of prosocial behavior
have produced inconsistent results. It is possible that some of the
cognitive measures which have been successfully associated with pro-
social behavior may include an implicit emotional component as well
since the two are clearly not independent.
In his review of the literature, Rushton (1976) concluded that
the research utilizing a purely cognitive conceptualization of empathy
may be lacking an important element. "Further research using a wider
range of role-taking tasks with particular emphasis on emotional role
taking skills might prove useful" (Rushton, 1976, p. 903). Cognitive
role taking is a skill which enables the child to understand, in an
abstract manner, the experience of another. As discussed earlier,
it does not involve a compelling motive for prosocial action.
Research on empathy and altruism : Affective perspectives
While only a few studies have been published which focus specifically
on the more affective component of empathy, they have been quite con-
sistent in demonstrating a positive association with prosocial behaviors.
Aronfreed and Paskal (in Aronfreed, 1968) developed an experimental
paradigm to study the assertion that a child's conditioned empathic
response could enhance prosocial behavior. Their procedure consisted
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of three phases: (1) the child's negative affect was conditioned to
the experimenter's expressive cues by pairing a loud noise with stan-
dardized distress cues, (2) the child was taught a lever-pulling
response to terminate an aversive noise, and (3) the child was given
an opportunity to respond altruistically to the distress cues of
another child by pulling the noise-terminating lever. The heightened
altruism of the experimental group of seven- and eight-year-old girls,
relative to the performance of the several control groups, led Aron-
freed (1968) to conclude that it was the experience of affective empathy
in response to the distress cues of the other child, rather than the
sheer information about the other's distress, which motivated the
helpful acts. Unfortunately, Aronfreed and Paskal did not assess the
children's empathic responses directly but simply inferred that their
conditioning procedure had induced a disposition to respond empathically.
In a correlational study using the Feshbach and Roe (1968) empathy
measure, Feshbach (1973) found empathy to be positively related to
generosity in six- and eight-year-olds. Iannotti (1975), using a
similar measure of empathy, found it to relate positively to sharing
in six- and nine-year-olds. Leiman (1978) found that five- and six-
year-old children who were judged as showing empathic facial expressions
upon seeing an actor lose his/her play materials (i.e., marbles) sub-
sequently behaved more altruistically than did children judged to be
relatively less empathic. Miller (1977) failed, however, to find a
consistent relationship between the Feshbach and Roe measure of em-
pathy and sharing in nine- and ten-year-olds. When one considers that
the Feshbach and Roe technique was designed for use with children
younger than Miller's sample, this failure to find an unambiguous rela-
tionship is not surprising.
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In an effort to combine the cognitive and affective dimensions of
empathic responsiveness, Kameya (1976) provided role-taking training
to groups of boys who differed in their relative capacity for empathy
as measured by the Feshbach and Roe technique. Role-taking experiences
were provided by encouraging the boys to act out stories using puppets,
with special emphasis given to the thoughts and feelings of the other
characters. Contrary to his predictions, Kameya found that his role-
taking training had no effect upon the altruism of the high-empathy
boys and produced inconsistent results with the low-empathy boys. In
a related vein, Johnson (1975) contrasted the cognitive and affective
perspective-taking skills of nine- to eleven-year-old children and
concluded that the affective perspective-taking measure was a better
predictor of one index of prosocial behavior, cooperation.
Finally, Feshbach (1978b) reported a pilot study in which empathy
training was given over a ten-week interval to groups of disadvantaged
children. Teachers' ratings revealed that the children in the condition
which stressed both cognitive and affective aspects of empathy were
significantly less aggressive and tended to behave more prosocially
than non-participating peers.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the studies reviewed in the last
two sections. First, the more "cognitive" indices of empathy relate
inconsistently to measures of prosocial behavior. Where cognitive
empathy does seem to lead to enhanced helping it is possible that an
implicit affective component may be operative as well. Second, affec-
tive empathy seems to be a more consistent predictor of prosocial
behavior than the predominantly cognitive versions, although there are
very few studies from which to make such a judgment.
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A critique of the research on empathy and altruism in children
The preceding review of relevant literature reveals several
gaps in our knowledge of the relationship between empathy and altruism.
One problem is that previous studies with children have been largely
correlational in nature such that the proposed causal link is obscured.
A sample of comments from investigators of the empathy-altruism rela-
tionship reveals an awareness of the need to manipulate empathy and
observe its impact upon the prosocial behavior of children. Iannotti
(1975) points out that "although there has been some correlational
evidence suggesting that empathy may be associated with prosocial
behaviors such as reduced aggression and altruism, there have been no
attempts to manipulate empathy as an independent variable in order to
ascertain its effect upon prosocial behaviors" (p. 24). Levine and
Hoffman (1975) conclude that "in future studies, manipulation of em-
pathic arousal and awareness within a situation calling for prosocial
activity might clarify the relationship between empathy and prosocial
behavior in young children" (p. 534).
An empathy manipulation approach has been used successfully with
adults (e.g., Aderman & Berkowitz, 1970; Batson et al., 1978) but has
not been attempted with children. The empathy manipulation was
developed by Stotland (1969) and contrasts the responses of subjects
asked to imagine themselves in the place of a target person with those
of subjects asked merely to observe the target individual. A modified
version of this approach was used in the present study. The manipu-
lation of empathic arousal as an independent variable with a measure of
altruism as a dependent variable is necessary to clarify the prior
correlational work and directly test the proposal that empathic arousal
elicits prosocial behavior in children.
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Another problem not sufficiently addressed by previous studies
is the developmental question of whether the relationship between
empathy and altruism is identical for both younger and older children.
Young children (under six years of age) may lack the sophistication to
act appropriately even though they may be empathically aroused. In
contrast with studies involving somewhat older children (Barnett,
Matthews, and Howard, 1979; Iannotti, 1975), several studies involving
children less than 6 years of age found either no or low positive
correlations between measures of empathy and various indices of pro-
social behavior (Eisenberg-Berg & Lennon, 1979; Iannotti, 1978;
Kameya, 1976; Levine & Hoffman, 1975) and positive associations between
empathy and measures of antisocial behavior (Feshbach & Feshbach, 1969;
Murphy, 1937). In addition, Hoffman's (1977a) theoretical work sug-
gests that some of the cognitive components of the empathic experience
may not be fully developed in the very young child. This apparent
developmental transition needs to be explored further.
A third question not answered by the studies reviewed above is the
possibility of an interaction of dispositional empathy with the empathy
arousing cues in the situation. While recognizing that there are
situational influences which may arouse empathy (Krebs, 1975; Stotland,
1969) and that individuals may have varying capacities for empathy
(Feshbach and Roe, 1968; Hoffman, 1975a; Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972),
both of these have not been manipulated in the same design. It is
likely that a highly empathic (or older) child may respond differently
than a relatively less empathic (or younger) child in situations
wherein the salience of empathic cues are varied.
27
Present Research
Overview
The present study was conducted in two sessions. During the first
session, the Feshbach and Roe (1968) empathy measure was administered
to identify those children whose capacity for empathy was either high
or low relative to their peers. In the second session, each child
received 30 prize chips which were described as being redeemable
for prizes at the conclusion of the study. The children were informed
that some boys and girls from another classroom would not be able to
participate and receive prizes, but that they could share some of
their earnings with them if they wished. High and low empathic
children from two age levels (preschoolers and kindergarteners;
first and second graders) were randomly assigned to one of two condi-
tions in which they were either (1) encouraged to focus on the feelings
of the less fortunate others or (2) encouraged to think about the less
fortunate others, but with no mention of feelings being made. The pri-
mary dependent variable was the number of prize chips donated, in
private, by each child. A brief post-experimental questionnaire was
administered to explore the child's feelings and comprehension of the
situation during the donation interval.
Hypotheses : Donation data
The major hypotheses of the present study were as follows:
(1) A main effect was predicted for high versus low dispositional
empathy. Highly empathic children were expected to be more altruistic
than less empathic children. The correlational research cited earlier
(c.f., Feshbach, 1973; Iannotti, 1974) generally points to this pre-
diction and provided a major impetus for this study.
28
(2) A main effect for High Empathy Arousal (HEA) versus
Low Empathy Arousal (LEA) was expected. The technique utilized
in the present investigation is similar to the approach developed by
Stotland (1969) and used by others (Brehm & Aderman, 1977; Regan &
Totten, 1975). In a related study with an adult sample, Aderman and
Berkowitz (1970) found that the empathy-arousal group helped a needy
other to a greater extent than did the control group. The HEA versus
LEA comparison in the present study is the crucial test of the
theoretical position of Hoffman (1976) and Feshbach (1973) that in-
creasing empathic arousal in children will cause an increase in al-
truistic behavior.
(3) A main effect for age level was predicted. In his review
of altruism research with children, Bryan (1975) concluded that older
children tend to share more in donation studies than do younger child-
ren. This developmental trend has been corroborated by more recent
work as well (e.g., Barnett, King, & Howard, 1979), Feshbach (1973)
reports that older children also tend to be more empathic than younger
children. This developmental increase in empathy might also lead one
to predict that older children would share more of their prize chips
than would younger children.
(4) No main effect of child's sex was predicted. Hoffman's
(1977b) review suggested that girls are consistently more empathic
than boys but that in individual studies the difference frequently
fails to reach statistical significance. One might expect the
greater empathy of girls to be associated with greater sharing than
boys. A closer examination of the findings reported by Hoffman
suggests, however, that the sex difference in empathy is more
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pronounced in children older than those in the present study. Finally,
Bryan (1975) concluded that in donation studies involving young
children, there has been no clear sex difference in sharing.
(5) An interaction was expected for high/low Dispositional
Empathy and the HEA/LEA manipulation. The low empathy children
were expected to remain unaffected by the HEA manipulation such
that their donations would be approximately equal across the two con-
ditions. The high empathy children, on the other hand, were expected
to become empathically aroused in the HEA condition, but remain rela-
tively unaroused in the LEA because of the absence of empathy cues.
The donations of the highly empathic children were therefore predicted
to differ significantly across the two conditions. As mentioned
earlier, Kameya (1976) predicted a similar pattern of responsiveness
to "cognitive" role-taking training by boys rated as high or low on
the Feshbach and Roe (1968) measure of empathy. However, he found no
effect for highs and inconsistent effects for lows with his cognitive
role-taking approach. It was anticipated that the use of the more
"affective" Stotland (1969) manipulation, wherein the children would
(or would not) be encouraged to imagine themselves feeling the other's
sadness, would be more successful.
(6) Finally, a three-way interaction was predicted for disposi-
tional empathy, HEA/LEA, and age level. While the two-way interaction
described in (5) was expected to be quite strong for the older
children, studies by Feshbach and Feshbach (1969) and Levine and Hoff-
man (1975) have suggested that younger children (even the highly
empathic ones) may not have the maturity necessary to transform em-
pathic arousal into appropriate prosocial action. Therefore, although
30
highly empathic younger children may be more aroused by the HEA
manipulation than are low empathic younger children, it was expected
that their levels of donating would be quite similar. In contrast,
highly empathic older children were expected to be more empathically
aroused and more charitable in the HEA condition than less empathic
older children.
Hypotheses : Questionnaire data
While the brief questionnaire (see Appendix 4) administered at
the end of the second session was largely exploratory in nature, the
purpose of each question, as well as specific predictions made, should
be noted.
(1) Question 1 was used as a manipulation check of the child's
comprehension of the alternatives available during the donation re-
quest, i.e., whether the child was aware that he or she had the option
to donate or not.
(2) Question 2 was intended as an "in task" assessment of each
child's affective empathy. Since factors associated with or promoting
heightened empathy should result in a child's experiencing more sadness
about the needy others, the following predictions were made: (a) highly
empathic children were expected to report feeling sadder than their
relatively less empathic peers, (b) the children in the HEA condition
were expected to feel sadder than the children in the LEA condition,
and (c) since older children have been found to be more empathic than
younger children, a main effect of age was also predicted.
(3) Question 3 was intended to assess each child's ability to
infer the probable affect of the less fortunate others. Since even
very young children have been shown to be aware of other individual's
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sadness (Borke, 1973; Sawin, 1979), it was expected that there
would be little difference between the responses given to this
question by the various groups of children.
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Method
Subjects and experimenters
A total of 88 males and 82 females from preschool through second-
grade classes in Manhattan, Kansas participated in the present inves-
tigation. The children were predominantly Caucasian and from middle-
class backgrounds. Each child received parental permission to parti-
cipate in the study. The parental permission form is presented in
Appendix 1.
The younger group of children were from preschool and kindergarten
classes and ranged in age from 45 months to 78 months (M = 5 years,
4 months). The older group of children were first- and second-graders
who ranged from 71 months to 111 months of age (M = 7 years, 1 month).
The first session was conducted by a male undergraduate assistant
who was trained to administer the Feshbach and Roe (1968) empathy
scale. The second session was conducted by a male graduate student
in psychology who was blind as to the empathy level of each child.
Apparatus
,
tests
,
and materials
The Feshbach and Roe (1968) measure of affective empathy was
used to assess each child's level of dispositional empathy because
it is the most widely used test of its kind for children between
four and eight years of age. Reliability and validity measures
have been satisfactory and are reported elsewhere (Feshbach, 1978a).
As will be recalled from the earlier description, the measure con-
sists of four pairs of slide sequences in which young children the
same sex as the child are shown in situations designed to elicit four
different emotions: happiness, sadness, anger, and fear. A brief
narration describing the events in the slides, but devoid of affective
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terms, accompanies each slide sequence. For the complete script of
the Feshbach and Roe (1968) slide sequences see Appendix 2. After
viewing each slide sequence the child is asked "How do you feel?"
or "Tell me how you feel." The responses are taperecorded for
future coding. If the child does not respond, the experimenter
probes once more using only the statements above. While the two
same-affect sequences are presented sequentially, the order of these
affect pairs is randomized and counterbalanced. To prevent possible
carry-over effects from the affect aroused during a prior sequence,
one minute filler periods are inserted between affects. During
these periods, the experimenter maintains a neutral dialogue with
the child.
In the present study, the children's responses to each slide se-
quence were scored by two independent raters on a three-point scale:
= an incorrect, instrumental, or task-irrelevant response; 1 a
generally correct response on the positive-negative affective dimension;
2 = the correct, specific emotion. The raters obtained an interrater
reliability of .93 on the individual responses. Disagreements were
resolved by a third independent rater.
Median splits on the total empathy scores were used to divide
the children into high and low empathy groups. While there was no
significant difference between the empathy scores for boys and girls
(_t[l68] = .45, ns) , the older group's scores were found to be signi-
ficantly higher than those of the younger group Ct[168] = 3.89, £ < .001),
2
Therefore, separate median splits were performed for each age level.
Table 1 presents the empathy score means and standard deviations by
child's sex and age level.
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Table 1: Empathy score descriptive statistics for sex and age level
Group n
Younger 88
Males 40
Females 48
M SD
6.59 5.50
6.70 5.46
6.50 5.58
Older 82
Males 48
Females 34
9.51 4.25
9.40 4.19
9.68 4.39
Note: For the younger age level, the median split was at 7. For
the older age level, the median split was at 11. Children
whose scores fell on the median for their respective age group
were excluded from all analyses which had High/Low disposi-
tional empathy as a factor (see footnote 2).
.
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The second session required that each child participate in a
task so that they could be awarded the prize chips. Although the
information obtained was not relevant to this study, the Children's
Personality Attributes Questionnaire or CPAQ (Spence & Helmreich,
1977) was used as the task. This brief masculinity-femininity ques-
tionnaire requires the child to respond by indicating the degree to
which he or she feels similar to another child described as engaging
in traditionally masculine or feminine behaviors. The responses
are obtained by having the child mark one of three boxes of increasing
size indicating increasing agreement with the particular statement.
The complete questionnaire and response scale appear in Appendix 3.
Each child received 30 plastic prize chips after completing
the CPAQ. The child was informed that each prize chip was worth
one small prize. A metal, unmarked canister was provided so that the
child might donate, in private, some of his or her prize chips. There
were several prize chips left in the canister at all times to serve as
evidence of prior donations.
Following the 60 second donation interval, the experimenter re-
turned and administered a brief questionnaire which contained a mani-
pulation check and other items relevant to the child's affect during
the task. The post-experimental questionnaire and the "smiley face"
scale which the children were trained to use to answer the last two
questions are presented in Appendices 4 and 5, respectively.
Procedure
First session
. In the first session, each child was escorted
individually to the experimental room in the school building. When
the child entered the experimenter said,
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Hi, my name is Cole. What's your name? Would you please
sit here? The reason we asked you to come here today
(child's name) is so that you can look at some pictures
and tell me how you feel about them. Do you like to look
at pictures? I am going to show you some pictures and
tell you some stories about some children about the same
age as you are.
The experimenter then presented the first slide sequence for
the first affect. The experimenter taperecorded the last line of his
script and the child's response to "How do you feel?" or "Tell me
how you feel." The experimenter then continued with the second
slide sequence of the first affect. After the second slide sequence
for the first affect was completed, the experimenter continued,
We have to let this light bulb cool off for a little bit because
it gets very hot, so while we are waiting, let's just talk.
The experimenter then turned the projector to "fan" and adjusted
the slide tray to the next affect. During the one minute interval,
the experimenter generated non-affect arousing fillers, such as:
What kinds of things do you do at school? . . . What about at
recess? Do you have any brothers or sisters? . . . What are their
names and ages? . . . What do you want to do when you grow up?
The experimenter then continued with the first slide sequence for the
second affect. The experimenter repeated this procedure for the re-
maining pairs of slide sequences. After the Feshbach and Roe measure
had been completed, the experimenter said,
Thank you for helping me today. You did a really good job.
The next person I need is (child ' s name) . Would please go
back to your classroom and show him(her) how to get here?
Thank you. Goodbye.
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Second session . As in the first session, each child was escorted
individually to the experimental room. When the child entered, the
experimenter said,
Hi, my name is Jeff. Are you (expected child's name)? Today
I am going to tell you about some children, ask you some ques-
tions, and have you color in this booklet. Let me show you
how this works. Here is your crayon. I am going to be asking
you some questions and you will mark your answers in the
booklet. The questions do not have right or wrong answers.
I want to know what you think about things, so be sure to mark
what you really think. OK?
The CPAQ was administered at this time. After the CPAQ had been
completed, the experimenter said to children in both the HEA and LEA
conditions,
OK, good. For working on this game, I want you to have
some prize chips. Here are 30 prize chips for you. Each
prize chip is worth one small prize. I will give you your
prizes for the prize chips when the experiment is over.
There is one more thing I need to tell you. I will only
be able to stay in your school for a short time, so some of
the other children in other classes will not get to be in the
experiment and will not get any prizes. The other children
are about half boys and half girls and are all about
the same age as you are.
For children in the HEA condition only, the experimenter
continued
,
Try to think about how the other children will feel when
they don't get any prizes. Think of how you would feel if
you were one of the other children who will not get any
prizes. Try to feel how they will feel.
It should be noted that the LEA and the HEA conditions were
identical except for the brief encouragement to empathize given to
the children in the HEA condition.
For all of the children, the experimenter then said,
If you would like to share any of your prize chips with the
other children who will not get to be in the experiment, you
can put some of your chips in this can.
The experimenter picked up the donation canister at this point
and shook it to demonstrate that other children had already contri-
buted. The experimenter further instructed the child,
You don't have to give any away, but you may if you want
to. I have to leave now to go to an important meeting. My
assistant will be with you in about one minute to ask you
some simple questions, so put any prize chips you want to
give to the other children in the can while you are alone.
Goodbye.
After the child had been allowed one minute to donate, the ex-
perimenter returned and explained to the child,
I still have some more time before my meeting starts so I
thought I would come back to talk with you myself. Now
let me put your prize chips in a safe place for you.
The experimenter then wrote the child's name on a small paper
sack and placed the child's remaining prize chips inside. The
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experimenter showed no response to the number of chips remaining,
even if the child solicited a response. The experimenter then told
the child,
When I am finished with this experiment, I will come to
your classroom and give you your prizes, ok? That way I
can give out the prizes to everyone at the same time.
Before you go back to your class, I want to ask you a few
more questions.
At this point, the experimenter administered the brief post-
experimental questionnaire (see Appendix 4). When it was completed,
the experimenter said
,
Thanks for helping me today. You did a very good job.
The next person I need to talk to is (child's name). Would
you please show him (her) how to get here? Thank you.
Goodbye.
Summary of the procedure
In clarifying the procedure, three points should be reiterated.
First, the sole purpose of the first session was to obtain each child's
empathy score. These scores were the basis for a high/low empathy
median split for each age level. Second, each child received 30
prize chips in the second session simply for participating in the ex-
periment. Highs and lows from each age level were exposed to either
an empathy arousing instructional set (HEA) or an instructional set
in which the needy others were described but the empathy cues were
relatively less salient (LFA) . An opportunity to share, in private,
was then provided. Third, following the donation interval, each
child responded to a brief questionnaire which contained a manipulation
check and provided additional information regarding the child's affective
state during the experiment.
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Results
Unexpectedly, the distribution of scores for the primary
dependent variable, number of prize chips donated, was very skewed
with 46% of the children failing to donate. Figure 1 presents the
donation distribution for the entire sample. Because of the extreme
non-normality of the data, the analysis of variance test of signi-
3ficance was deemed inappropriate.
The Wilson (1956) test of significance was utilized in analyzing
the donation data. The Wilson test is a non-parametric technique,
2
similar to the standard x test, which allows for individual tests
of main effects and interactions. The logic of the test follows in
three steps: (1) the median score on the dependent measure is deter-
mined, (2) scores in each cell are reduced to simply the number of
subjects who scored on or above the median and those who scored below
2
the median, (3) a x test is then performed to determine if the pro-
portion of subjects observed above and below the median differs
significantly across conditions. To test specific main effects and
interactions, the cells are collapsed to form the comparison of interest,
Table 2 presents the number of children donating above and below the
median in each cell. Although cell means are not used in the Wilson
test, they have been included in Table 2 for clarity. Table 2a pre-
sents the summary data for the four main effects. Table 3 presents
the results of the donation data analyses.
Donation data
. The results of the donation data analyses are
presented below in the order that the specific predictions (see page 27)
were listed.
Figure 1. Distribution of Donations
for the Total Sample
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Table 2. Mean Number of Trize Chips Donated and Number of Subjects
Above and Below the Median.
HEA
Age Level-Empathy Disposition
Young-High
male
female
Young-Low
male
female
Old-High
male
female
Old-Low
male
female
LEA
Age Level-Empathy Disposition
Young-High
male
female
Young-Low
male
female
Old-High
male
female
Old-Low
male
female
Subjects
Above/Below
Median*
10/13
5/6
5/7
10/11
4/5
6/6
17/5
12/0
5/5
12/6
8/3
4/3
8/12
4/6
4/6
6/16
3/7
3/9
9/8
6/4
3/4
9/9
6/6
3/3
Mean
3.17
4.18
2.25
3.57
4.67
2.75
6.32
7.08
5.40
5.00
5.82
3.71
2.10
2.80
1.40
4.09
3.40
4.67
3.65
4.80
2.00
4.06
4.25
3.67
*The median fell between 1 and 2 prize chips.
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Table 2a. Mean Number of Prize Chips Donated and Number of Subjects
Above and Below the Median for the Tests of Main Effects
Variable
Subjects
Above/Below
Median Mean
Empathy Disposition
High
Low
Condition
HEA
LEA
Age Level
Old
Sex
Young
Male
Female
44/38
37/42
49/35
32/45
47/23
34/52
48/37
33/43
3.85
4.15
4.63
3.45
4.74
3.41
4.73
3.31
Table 3. Wilson Analysis of the Donation Data
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Source
2
Dispositional Empathy (DE) .749
HEA/LEA (H/L) 4.522
Age Level (AL) 8.575
Child's Sex (CS) 2.733
DE x H/L -.093*
DE x AL -.043*
DE x CS .642
H/L x AL .056
H/L X CS .691
AL x CS .482
DE x H/L x AL .617
DE x H/L x CS .302
DE x AL x CS .959
H/L x AL x CS .894
DE x H/L x AL x CS -.198*
df £
1 n. s.
1 <. 05
1 <. 01
1 n. s.
1 n. s.
1 n. s.
1 n. s.
1 n. s.
1 n. s.
1 n s.
1 n s.
1 n s.
1 n s.
1 n s.
1 n s.
*Note: As with many computer programs for the analysis of variance,
when the magnitude of an interaction is extremely small, the
estimate obtained by the Uilson test may be negative due to
the subtraction process used to calculate the interaction
values.
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(1) Contrary to prediction, Dispositional Empathy, as measured
by the Feshbach and Roe (1968) empathy scale, was not found to be
associated with the children's donations. Highly empathic children
actually donated slightly fewer prize chips than did their relatively
less empathic peers but the difference between highs and lows did
not approach statistical significance.
(2) As predicted, there was a significant main effect of
HEA/LEA; children in the HEA condition showed a higher incidence
of donating than did the children in the LEA condition.
(3) As predicted, a significant main effect of Age Level was
also found. Older children showed a higher incidence of donating
than did the younger children.
(4) As expected, there was no main effect for sex of subject
on the Wilson test, with the proportions of boys and girls above and
below the median not statistically different from one another.
(5) Contrary to prediction, no interaction of Dispositional
Empathy and HEA/LEA was found.
(6) Finally, the expected three-way interaction of Dispositional
Empathy, HEA/LEA, and Age Level failed to reach statistical significance.
Post-experimental questionnaire . (See Appendix 4 for a complete
listing of questionnaire items.) Question 1 served as a manipulation
check. Ninety-five percent of the children responded that they knew
that they could donate if they wished but were not required to do so.
Of the eight children who answered incorrectly, seven were from the
younger age level and were evenly distributed across the experimental
conditions; all of these children were retained in the analyses.
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Table 4 presents a summary of the responses to Questions 2 and
3. These responses were analyzed with 2 (Dispositional Empathy) x
2(HEA/LEA) x 2 (Age Level) x 2 (Sex of Child) analyses of variance.
Summaries of these analyses are presented in Tables 5 and 6.
The results for the specific predictions for Question 2 (see
page 30) are as follows:
(1) Contrary to expectation, Dispositional Empathy was not
found to be associated with responses to Question 2. Highly empathic
children did not report feeling significantly sadder (M = 3.72) than
did the less empathic children (M = 3.41).
(2) As predicted, children in the HEA condition reported feeling
sadder than did the children in the LEA condition. (Means are pre-
sented in the "Total" column of Table 4.)
(3) As predicted, older children reported feeling sadder than
did the younger children (M = 3.99 and 3.16, respectively).
(4) There was no significant main effect for Sex of Child; boys
and girls had the identical mean score of 3.56 on this question.
Although not predicted, a significant interaction of Age Level
and HEA/LEA was found on this question. A subsequent Newman-Keuls
analysis revealed that the interaction was due primarily to the children
in the Young-LEA group (M = 2.65) who reported being significantly
less sad than children in the Y/mng-EEA (M = 3.64), Old-LEA (M = 3.90),
and Old-HEA (M = 4.07) groups, who did not differ significantly from
one another. This finding is understandable since one would expect
the children in the Young-LEA group to be the least empathic and,
thus, the least saddened by the plight of the unfortunate others.
However, the interaction probably adds little additional information
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Table 4. Mean Responses to Questions 2 and 3 by Condition.
Age level - Empathy disposition
Young-High
male
female
Young-Low
male
female
Old-High
male
female
Old-Low
male
female
Question 2
HEA LEA
3.96 2.85
3.82 2.40
4.08 3.30
3.29 2.55
3.56 2.20
3.08 2.83
3.91 4.18
4.08 4.20
3.70 4.14
4.22 3.78
4.00 4.00
4.57 3.33
Total 3.83 3.27
Question 3
HEA LEA
4.96 4.90
4.91 4.80
5.00 5.00
4.48 4.14
4.11 3.60
4.75 4.58
4.77 4.82
4.67 4.80
4.90 4.86
4.67 4.50
5.00 4.42
4.14 4.67
4.73 4.57
Question 2: How did you feel when I told you about the other children
who wouldn't get any prizes?
Question 3: How did you think the other children would feel when
they didn't get any prizes?
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Table 5. Analysis of Responses to Question 2.
Source df MS P £
n.s.Dispositional Empathy (DE) 1 2.835 1.868
HEA/LEA (R/L) 1 11.002 7.123 <.01
Age Level (AL) 1 27.384 17.728 <.001
Child's Sex (CS) 1 0.347 0.225 n.s.
DE x H/L 1 0.189 0.122 n.s.
DE x AL 1 1.992 1.290 n.s.
DE x CS 1 0.264 0.171 n.s.
H/L x AL 1 7.427 4.808 <.05
H/L X CS 1 1.020 0.660 n.s.
AL x CS 1 2.095 1.356 n.s.
DE x H/L x AL 1 2.984 1.932 n.s.
DE x H/L x CS 1 0.492 0.319 n.s.
DE x AL x CS 1 1.286 0.833 n.s.
H/L x AL x CS 1 4.003 2.591 n.s.
DE x H/L x AL x CS
Error
1
145
2.492
1.545
1.613 n.s.
Table 6. Analysis of Responses to Question 3.
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Source df MS F 2.
Dispositional Empathy (DE) 7.252 11.176 <.001
HEA/LEA (H/L) 0.595 0.917 n.s.
Age Level (AL) 0.355 0.547 n.s.
Child's Sex (CS) 1.832 2.824 n.s.
DE x H/L 0.598 0.922 n.s.
DE x AL 1 1.915 2.951 n.s.
DE x CS 0.174 0.268 n.s.
H/L x AL 0.278 0.428 n.s.
H/L X CS 0.951 1.465 n.s.
AL x CS 2.688 4.142 <.05
DE x H/L x AL 0.065 0.101 n.s.
DE x H/L x CS 1.223 1.884 n.s.
DE x AL x CS 3.145 4.860 <.05
H/L x AL x CS 0.116 0.179 n.s.
DE x H/L x AL x CS 0.661 1.018 n.s.
Error 145 0.649
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beyond that obtained in the two main effects because of the likeli-
hood that the responses of the Old-HEA group were influenced by a
ceiling effect.
Scores on Question 3 were consistently high (overall M = 4.66
out of a possible 5) indicating that most children thought the children
who would not get any prizes would be extremely sad. Even with the
restricted range of responses on this question, an analysis of
variance revealed a significant main effect for dispositional empathy.
Highly empathic children indicated that the less fortunate others
would feel sadder (M = 4.87) than did the less empathic children
(M = 4.43). Since there was no disposition effect for Question 2,
the more affective empathy index, this finding is problematic and will
be addressed more fully in the discussion section of this paper.
Table 6 shows that there were two interactions which also reached
statistical significance. Newman-Keuls analyses revealed that both
interactions were primarily due to the younger, low empathy boys
who rated the feelings of the less fortunate others significantly
less unhappy (M = 3.60) than did all other groups (overall M = 4.77
for the remaining seven groups) . These two interactions appear unin-
terpretable.
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Discussion
In the present study, children in the HEA condition were more
altruistic than were the children in the LEA condition. Moreover,
even though all of the children were aware that the less fortunate
others would be quite sad (Question 3), the children in the HEA
condition felt sadder than the children in the LEA condition
(Question 2). It would appear, therefore, that the instructions to
vicariously experience the feelings of the needy others effectively
aroused an empathic response and subsequently heightened the child's
charitable behavior. This pattern of findings is consistent with
that reported in studies manipulating empathic arousal in adults
(Aderman & Berkowitz, 1970; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Krebs,
1975) and provides support for the theoretical assertion (Feshbach,
1973; Hoffman, 1976) that arousing empathy in young children may
motivate helping behavior.
In addition, older children were found to be more altruistic
than younger children. This effect has been found consistently in
donation studies involving children (Bryan, 1975) but the explanation
for this developmental trend remains unclear. There are probably
many reasons why older children might exhibit heightened levels of
prosocial behavior, such as a greater awareness of the "norm of
responsibility" (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1964) or enhanced moral reasoning
levels relative to younger children (Kohlberg, 1963). However, the
finding in the present study that older children reported being
sadder, that is, more empathically aroused, than did the younger
children, is at least consistent with the assertion that a greater
empathic responsivity in older children may contribute to their ten-
dency to behave more altruistically.
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There were apparently two major problems encountered in the
present study. The first problem concerns the highly skewed nature
of the distribution of donations (requiring the use of non-parametric
statistical tests). Although the donation paradigm is often used in
studies of prosocial behavior (see reviews by Bryan [1975] and
Rushton [1976]), few studies have involved such young children.
Perhaps the donation of task earnings is a rather unusual behavior
for young children. The large number of children who did not donate
at all (46%) would lead one to suspect that the helping measure might
have been more effective had it been made more congruent with the
children's regular repertoire of behaviors.
The second problem involved the assessment of dispositional
empathy. None of the predicted main or interaction effects involving
the dispositional empathy factor were found to approach statistical
significance with respect to donations. There are several reasons
why this result might have been obtained. Leiman (1973) has noted
that the Feshbach and Roe (1968) scale (1) is highly dependent on
verbal-cognitive skills, (2) measures voluntary responses which are
vulnerable to demand characteristics of the experimental situation,
(3) requires children to repeatedly report their own emotions, which
may prompt a child to respond too quickly to "speed things along,"
and (4) perhaps unrealistically assumes that children will form an
emotional relationship with a story character and that this type of
emotional matching is generalizable to interactions with peers. The
criticism that the Feshbach and Roe measure may be unduly influenced
by cognitive skills is supported by the finding in the present study
that responses to the Feshbach and Roe were more closely associated
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with responses to Question 3, the cognitive perspective-taking item,
than with responses to Question 2, the "in task" measure of affective
empathy. If, in fact, the Feshbach and Roe (1968) technique is pri-
marily a measure of the child's cognitive perspective-taking skills,
it is not surprising that it was ineffective in predicting helping
behavior.
The consistent responses to Question 3 indicate that even very
young children can demonstrate an awareness of another's sadness,
corroborating an earlier finding by Borke (1973). Moreover, the
pattern of donations across conditions demonstrates that encouraging
young children to empathize with the feelings of less fortunate others
may enhance helping behavior. This finding, in addition to being
supportive of the empathy arousal-altruism hypothesis, also appears
to have important implications for child-rearing. Hoffman (1975b)
reported a significant positive correlation between fifth-graders'
altruism toward their peers and parental use of discipline techniques
which involve focusing the child's attention upon the feelings of others.
This association, along with the findings of the present study, supports
the notion that adult intervention which directs the child's empathic
responsiveness to the feelings of others in discipline and non-discipline
situations may promote prosocial behavior in young children. Moreover,
since no interaction of HEA/LEA and age level was found, the present
study suggests that the intervention of a parent may be necessary to
activate even the six- and seven-year-old child's capacity for empathy.
It would seem, therefore, that discipline techniques which emphasize
others' feelings, and appeals to help which similarly induce empathic
arousal, may be useful methods adults can utilize to promote prosocial
behaviors in young children.
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Additional studies of children's empathy and helping behaviors
are needed to investigate the questions left unanswered by the pre-
sent experiment. Better measures of dispositional empathy in young
children, perhaps using facial expressions or other nonverbal cues,
are clearly needed. In addition, the study of naturally occurring
helping behaviors may avoid the "floor effect" encountered in the
present study while also enhancing external validity.
Future research should also explore the effect of having a less
fortunate other immediately present in the situation, rather than
merely described as in the present study. This would likely have the
effect of heightening the salience of the empathy cues for the poten-
tial helper. The work of Feshbach and Roe (1968) and others
(Krebs, 1975; Stotland, 1969) suggests that the sex and relative
similarity of the target individual may be important variables in
this type of encounter. In addition, little is known regarding the
power of a peer to induce empathic arousal; perhaps children could
be trained to facilitate empathizing in their peers.
Finally, future studies should investigate the extent to which the
ability to transform motives, such as empathic arousal, into action
requires additional helping-relevant skills. Children (and adults)
are likely to vary in (1) their relative ability to generate a range
of possible helping responses and to select the most appropriate one,
and (2) their level of competence and/or assertiveness to actually
follow through once the appropriate response is chosen. An extremely
empathy-arousing situation may simply debilitate (or yield avoidance
behavior in) a person, even a highly empathic one, who lacks these
additional skills.
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Clearly, much work remains to be done before a comprehensive
understanding of the role of empathy in the development and expres-
sion of prosocial behavior is possible. However, the present
study has shown that empathic arousal may provide an important moti-
vational construct for future theories of altruism in young children.
56
Footnotes
Affective empathy implies emotional arousal in the empathic
observer. This has led to several investigations of the physiological
component of empathy. Because these studies have not involved children,
they will not be considered in the text of the present paper. However,
they are briefly reviewed below for interested readers.
When dealing with emotional arousal, two components can be
studied. The emotion can be considered to have a subjective element
and a physiological component. "The ideal measure of an empathic
response," says Hoffman (1977b), "would include evidence that a)
affect has been aroused in the observer, and b) the quality and
direction of the affect correspond to those experienced by the person
being observed" (p. 713). Physiological measures of empathy, while
meeting the first criterion, fail on the second. Investigators hoping
to benefit from the use of these physiological techniques have studied
changes in galvanic skin response, vasoconstriction, and heart rate
(e.g., Krebs, 1975), and palmar sweating (Stotland, 1969). Berger
(1962) used physiological measures in a paradigm to condition empathy,
but noted that, while increased GSR may indicate empathy, some sadistic
individuals may enjoy another person's pain and show a similar GSR
reaction. Hoffman (1977b) adds that the physiological measure may
simply reflect the individual's startle response to the movement of
another, or may be a response to the noxious stimulus and not the
observed person's distress cues. In addition, one study found a nega-
tive relationship between the magnitude of physiological arousal and
the introspective reports of the intensity of feelings of distress
the subjects experienced as they watched a model receive shocks
(Craig & Lowery, 1969).
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There have been no physiological studies done with children to
address the empathy-altruism relationship, but in spite of the above
problems, studies have been conducted with adults. Krebs (1975)
found that empathy and altruism are positively related in college
students. Using the measures listed above, he manipulated the
similarity of the target character to the subject, and the amount of
pleasure or pain the target person experienced. "When required to
make a choice between helping themselves at a cost to the performer
or helping the performer at a cost to themselves, the subjects who
reacted most empathically behaved most altruistically" (Krebs,
1975, p. 1134). Subjects who believed the performer was experiencing
greater pleasure or pain exhibited greater psychophysiological reactions
than those subjects who did not. Subjects who believed they were
similar to the performer empathized more than those who believed they
were different from the performer.
2
The statistics reported in the results section are based upon
the scores of the 170 boys and girls who participated in the study
with the following exception. In the analysis of the primary depen-
dent variable (i.e., number of prize chips donated) 3 boys and 6
girls fell on the "empathy" median when their respective age levels
were divided into highs and lows. Since these nine children were
neither highs nor lows, they were excluded from the analysis of the
donation data and all subsequent analyses involving high/low disposi-
tional empathy.
3
To determine whether responses are distributed in a normal dis-
2tribution, Hays (1963) suggests a simple x goodness-of-f it test.
The distribution of donations differed significantly from normal
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(X = 317.52, £ < .001) and even after the X' = Vx + .5 transformation
suggested by Winer (1971) the distribution remained markedly non-
2
normal (^ = 267.90, p_ < «001). Although the analysis of variance
test of significance is quite robust, the extreme non-normality of the
distribution made the use of a parametric statistic inappropriate.
4
A recent textbook of research methods in developmental psychology
(Achenbach, 1978) suggests that the Wilson test is appropriate for
extremely skewed distributions. Wilson's technique has been used
regularly in many areas of behavioral research.
Although the difference between the means for boys and girls
is actually greater than the difference between the means for HEA
and LEA, the Wilson test (which reduces the impact of extreme scores
contributing to mean differences) resulted in a nonsignificant
main effect for sex.
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Appendix 1. Parental Permission Form
October, 1977
Dear Marlatt School Parent:
During the next several weeks, the Unified School District No. 383
will be cooperating with the faculty in the Psychology Department
at Kansas State University in investigating aspects of children's
social development. Now we are asking for your help. Children
participating in the study will be asked to view a series of slides
showing children their own age engaging in a variety of activities
and will be asked to answer some simple questions about the slides.
The children will be awarded a small prize at the conclusion of the
study.
Each first grade child will be asked to help in this project by
giving us about 20-25 minutes of his or her time during the next
several weeks. The study involves no stress on the child. Indeed,
the great majority of children find participation in these studies
quite enjoyable. The names of the children will not be used in re-
porting the results of the study.
Please indicate on the form below whether you will or will not allow
your child to take part in this study and return the permission slip
to the classroom. If you have any questions about the nature of
this study, please feel free to telephone Dr. Mark Barnett at 532-
6850 (Psychology Department, Kansas State University).
Thank you for your cooperation.
(permission slip)
I
I will allow my child,
] * will not allow my child
,
to participate in the study outlined above.
(signature)
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Appendix 2. Feshbach Empathy Scale:
Scripts for Slides
H-I (Boy)
1. This boy decided to enter a contest that he learns about on T.V.
The prize is two tickets for everything in Disneyland, even
including food.
2. Here he is mailing his entry hoping that he will win.
3. He has won. Here he is receiving the good news in the mail and the
tickets as well. Wait until his friends and family hear about his.
H-I (Girl)
1. This girl decides to enter a contest that she hears about on T.V.
The prize is two tickets for everything at Disneyland, even
including food.
2. Here she is mailing her entry hoping that she will win.
3. She has won. Here she is receiving the good news in the mail and
the tickets as well. Wait till her friends and family hear about this.
H-II (Boy)
1. This boy has just awakened and he remembers that today is his birthday.
2. Here he is greeting his friends who are coming to his party.
3. Now he is ready to blow out the candles on his delicious cake before
he opens his many presents.
H-II (Girl)
1. This girl has just awakened and she remembers that today is her
birthday.
2. Here she is greeting her friends who are coming to her party.
3. Nov; she is ready to blow out the candles on her delicious cake
before she opens her many presents.
A-I (Boy)
1. Two boys are playing ball. One boy is asking the other boy not to
play so close to the window because it might break.
2. The boy didn't listen. The ball did hit the window and the glass
shattered all over.
3. And when the owner rushed out to see what happened, the boy who
really broke the window blamed it on the other boy.
A-I (Girl)
1. Two girls are playing ball. One girl is asking the other girl not
to play so close to the window because it might break.
2. The girl didn't listen. The ball did hit the window and the glass
shattered all over.
3. And when the owner rushed out to see what happened, the girl who
really broke the window blamed it on the other girl.
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A-II (Boy)
1. The boy in the grey sweatshirt is getting ready to test his new
rocket. The boy standing up is watching him.
2. The boy who was watching is trying to grab this other boy's
rocket away.
3. The boy has managed to grab and take away this boy's new rocket.
A-II (Girl)
1. The girl sitting down is playing with her new Mary Poppins doll.
The girl standing up is watching her.
2. The girl who was watching is trying to grab this other girl's
doll away.
3. The girl did grab and take away this girl's new doll.
S-I (Boy)
1. Here is a boy and his dog. This boy goes everywhere with his dog
but sometimes the dog tries to run away.
2. Here he is running away again.
3. This time the dog cannot be found and the boy realizes that the dog
may be gone and lost forever.
S-I (Girl)
1. • Here is a girl and her dog. This girl goes everywhere with her dog
but sometimes the dog tries to run away.
2. Here he is running away again.
3. This time the dog cannot be found and the girl realizes that the
dog may be gone and lost forever.
S-II (Boy)
1. This boy has just moved into the neighborhood. He sees some boys
playing a fun game. He would love to be able to join them.
2. He asks to join in. They say "no". They have enough children
and besides they really don't know him.
3. The other children continue to play. He has no one to play with.
S-II (Girl)
1. This girl just moved into the neighborhood. She sees some girls
playing a fun game. She would love to be able to join them.
2. She asks to join in. They say "no". They have enough children and
besides they really don't know her.
3. The other children continue to play. She has no one to play with.
F-I (Boy)
1. This boy is picnicing with his family in a wooded forest. His
parents asked him to bring some water from the well near the road.
2. He seems to have taken the wrong turn because there is no road,
only trees and more forest.
3. He is getting deeper and deeper in the forest. It is getting darker.
Night is coming and he cannot even see where to go. He doesn't
know how to find his way back.
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F-I (Girl)
1. This girl is picnicing with her family in a wooded forest. Her
parents asked her to bring some water from the well near the road.
2. She seems to have taken the wrong turn because there is no road,
only trees and more forest.
3. She is getting deeper and deeper in the forest. It is getting
darker. Night is coming and she cannot even see where to go.
She doesn't know how to find her way back.
F-II (Boy)
1. This boy sees a big dog. He does not know whether the dog is
friendly or mean.
2. The dog begins to run after the boy. The boy tries to get away.
3. The boy is not able to get away and the mean dog is going to
attack him.
F-II (Girl)
1. This girl sees a big dog. She does not know whether the dog is
friendly or mean.
2. The dog begins to run after the girl. The girl tries to get away.
3. The girl is not able to get away and the mean dog is going to
attack her.
'
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Appendix 3. Children's Personality Attributes Questionnaire
Now I am going to tell you about some children. I want to know
how much you are like each of these children. There are no right
or wrong answers because all people are different.
* Put your finger at the beginning of the first row. Think about
a child who watches TV a lot. This child watches as much TV as they
can. I want to know how much you watch TV. Look up here while I
show you how to mark. If you watch TV a lot, you will put an X on
the big box like this. (Demonstrate on the board; then erase the X.)
If you watch TV somewhat, you will put an X on the middle box, like
this. (Demonstrate on the board, then erase the X.) If you watch
TV only a little bit, you will put an X on the little box, like this.
(Demonstrate on the board, then erase the X.) Does everybody under-
stand? Now mark how much you watch TV. Mark how much you watch TV.
(Check to see that each child has marked a box. Explain to individuals
who do not understand.)
Let me tell you one more thing. Suppose you have marked a box
and then want to change your answer. Suppose you have marked the
middle box, like this (mark middle box) and want to change your answer
to the big box. You can change your answer by scratching out the
old answer, like this (demonstrate), and then marking your new answer
(demonstrate)
.
*2. Nov; put your finger by row 2. Think about a child who eats a lot
of vegetables. This child eats a lot of things like spinach and
peas and carrots. Mark the box that shows how much you eat vege-
tables. Mark how much you eat vegetables. (Pause to allow all
children to mark.) If you eat vegetables a lot, you should have
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marked the big box; if you eat vegetables somewhat, you should
have marked the middle box; if you eat vegetables only a little,
you should have marked the little box. (Check to see that each
child has marked a box. Explain to individuals who do not under-
stand.)
3. Put your finger by row 3. Think about a child who always wants
to do better than other children. This child hates to lose a
game or have other kids do better than they do. This child al-
ways wants to come in first, like winning a game. Mark the
box that shows how much you want to be the best. Mark how
much you want to be the best.
F+ *4. Put your finger by row 4. Think about a child who is gentle.
When this child plays with other kids they are very careful
not to hurt them. Mark how gentle you are. Mark how gentle
you are.
MF *5. Put your finger by row 5. Think about a child who cries a lot.
Mark how much you cry. Mark how much you cry.
M- 6. Put your finger by row 6 at the top of the page like this. (Demon-
strate and check to see that each child is in the right place.)
Think about a child who gives up easily. When this child doesn't
do well on something like playing a game, they give up right
away. Mark how much you give up right away. Mark how much you
give up right away.
F+ *7. Put your finger by row 7. Think about a child who cares about how
other people are feeling. When other children are sad, this child
tries to make them feel better. Mark how much you care about how
other people are feeling. Mark how much you care about how other
r i •people are feeling.
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MF 8. Put your finger by row 8. Think about a child whose feelings get
hurt easily. When someone isn't nice to them this child feels
really bad. Mark how much your feelings get hurt easily, Mark
how much your feelings get hurt easily.
M+ *9. Put your finger by row 9. Think about a child who always tries
to do things for themselves. This child doesn't like to ask grown-
ups or other kids for help if they don't have to. This child likes
to do things for themselves . Mark how much you try to do things
for yourself. Mark how much you always try to do things for
yourself.
F+*10. Put your finger by row 10. Think about a child who always lets
other people know how they feel. This child always lets other
people know when they are happy or sad. Mark how much you let
other people know how you feel. Mark how much you let other people
know how you feel.
MF 11. Now turn the page. You should see a 3 at the top of the page and
some boxes on the page. (Demonstrate and check to see that each
child is on page 3.) Put your finger by the first row. Think
about a child who cares a lot about whether other people like
them. This child wants to do things that will make other people
like them. Mark how much you care a lot about what other people
think of you. Mark how much you care a lot about what other
people think of you.
M+ 12. Put your finger by row 2. Think about a child who can make up
their mind about things. This child is always sure about what to
do. Mark how sure you are about things. Mark how sure you are.
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F+ 13. Put your finger by row 3. Think about a child who is never selfish.
This child always likes to do things for other people and never
just for themselves. Mark how much you try to do things for other
people... how much you try to do things for other people.
MF 14. Put your finger by row 4. Think about a child who always tries to
get their own way. When this child wants something they try to make
other people do what they want. Mark how much you try to get your
own way. . .how much you always try to get your own way.
M+*15. Put your finger by row 5. Think about a child who is very good at
things. This child does things better than other children. Mark
how much you are better than other children. . .how much you are
better than other children.
F+*16. Put your finger by row 6 at the top of the page. (Check to see
that each child is in the right place.) Think about a child who
is always kind. This child always likes to be nice to other people
and never likes to do things that make people unhappy. Mark you
kind you are. . .how kind you are.
MF 17. Put your finger by row 7. Think about a child who needs to have
grown-ups or other kids to help them. Mark how much you need to
have people help you... how much you need to have other people
help you.
M+ 18. Put your finger by row 8. Think about a child who thinks they
are pretty good at whatever they try to do. Most of the time this
child is sure that they can do what they try to do. Mark how
much you think you are pretty good at whatever you try to do...
how much you think you are pretty good at whatever you try to do.
•
.
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F+*19. Put your finger by row 9. Think about a child who is always
helpful to others. This child always likes to help their
friends and family. Mark how helpful you are... how helpful
you are.
MF 20. Put your finger by row 10. Think about a child who is always
the leader. This child's friends let them decide what they are
going to do or be the boss. Mark how much you are the leader...
how much you are the leader.
From: Spence & Helmreich, 1977
Note: Asterisks denote those items used for the younger age level.
The task was reduced to ten items for the younger children
because the full 20 item scale was inappropriate, time-consuming
and caused the younger children to lose interest. The older
children were quite able to complete the entire 20 items in
approximately the same amount of time as was required for the
younger children to complete the 10 items indicated.
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Appendix 4. Post-experimental questionnaire
(1) Remember when I gave you those prize chips? What did I say you
were to do with them?
a) Did I say you had to keep them?
b) Did I say you had to give some away?
c) Did I say you could give some away if you wanted to?
d) Do you forget what I said about the prize chips?
Now I have another way I want you to answer the questions.
See these faces? This one is very sad; he/she feels very bad. This
one is very happy; he/she feels very happy. This one feels a little
bit sad; and this one feels a little bit happy. This one is right
in the middle because he/she doesn't feel happy and he/she doesn't
feel sad either. When I ask you a question, I want you to point to
one of the faces which feels the way you feel.
Example 1:
How would you feel if it was your birthday and you were having
a big party?
Example 2:
.
How would you feel if you fell down and hurt your knee?
(2) Remember when I told you about the other children who will not
get any prizes? How did you feel when I told you about the
other children?
(3) Remember when I told you about the other children who will not
get any prizes? How did you think they would feel?
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Appendix 5. Questionnaire Response Scale
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Note: The figure above is drawn h scale. No numerals were included
on the original response scale. The numbers given above indi-
cate how each child's responses were scored.
Appendix 6: Raw Data
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The following information is provided for each subject:
Subject Number (No)
Sex of Subject (Sex) Male = 1; Female = 2
Age in Months (Age)
Age Group (AG) Older = 1; Younger = 2
Condition (Cond) HEA = 1; LEA = 2
Specific affect empathy scores
a) Sad (S)
b) Angry (A)
c) Fearful (F)
d) Happy (H)
Total Empathy (TE)
Number of Tokens Donated (Donat)
Responses to Questionnaire Items
a) Question 2 (Q2)
b) Question 3 (Q3)
No Sex Age AG Cond S A F H TE Donat Q2 Q3
1 1 85 1 2 3 3 2 4 12 2 5 5
2 1 78 1 2 2 2 2 2 8 12 4 5
3 1 81 1 1 2 2 2 3 9 6 3 5
4 2 78 1 2 2 4 6 5 5
5 2 86 1 2 4 4 4 2 14 4 5
6 1 77 1 2 4 4 3 3 14 5 5
7 1 79 1 2 1 1 2 6 4 5
8 2 79 1 2 4 2 3 2 11 2 5
9 1 86 1 1 2 2 4 4 4 5
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No Sex Age AG Cond S A F H TE Donat Q2 Q3
10 2 78 1 1 4 4 2 4 14 3 5 5
11 1 80 1 1 2 2 2 1 7 7 5 5
12 2 75 1 1 4 2 2 4 12 1 •
13 1 81 1 2 2 2 2 2 8 5 4 4
14 1 80 1 1 4 1 3 4 12 9 5 4
15 1 85 1 1 3 4 3 4 14 6 5
;16 1 84 1 2 4 2 2 4 12 3
17 2 76 1 2 2 2 2 3 *
18 1 76 1 2 4 4 3 4 15 2 4 5
19 2 77 1 2 4 4 2 4 14 6 3 4
20 1 80 1 2 1 1 2 4 4 5
21 2 76 1 1 2 1 4 7 4 4 4
522 1 82 1 1 4 4 4 4 16 7 4
23 2 86 1 1 2 1 2 5 2 5 5
24 2 85 1 1 4 3 3 3 13 8 3 5
25 1 79 1 1 4 4 12 5 5
26
27
2
2
77
81
1
1
1
2
4
4
2
2
2
3
4
4
12
13 2
3
5
'•
28 2 76 1 1 4 2 2 4 12 5 5
29 2 71 1 2 2 2 2 6 5 2 5
30 1 75 1 1 3 4 2 4 13 3 4 5
31 1 79 1 2 4 3 2 4 13 3 5
32 2 84 1 1 1 1 18 5 4
33 2 77 1 1 3 2 2 2 9 2 5 5
34 1 87 1 1 2 1 2 3 8 7 2 5
35 1 76 1 1 4 4 2 4 14 10 4 5
36 1 83 1 2 4 2 2 8 6 3 5
No Sex Age AG Cond S A F H
37 2 86 1 1 4 3 2 4
38 1 81 1 1
39 1 77 1 2 3 1 1 2
40 2 86 1 2 3 2 2 4
41 2 84 1 1 4 2 3 4
42 1 83 1 2 3 3 2 3
43 1 85 1 1 4 3 3 4
44 2 80 1 2 4 2 2 4
45 1 84 1 2 4 3 3 1
46 1 78 1 1 4 3 3 4
47 2 85 1 1 4 3 3 4
48 1 87 1 2 3 3 2 3
49 2 83 1 1
50 2 94 1 2 2 2 2 3
51 1 86 1 1 1 2
52 1 88 1 1 2 3 3 4
53 1 82 1 2 3 3 3 4
54 1 79 1 2 2 2 2 3
55 1 76 1 1 3 4 2 3
56 1 78 1 2 3 3 3 3
57 2 78 1 1 2
58 2 88 1 1 4 3 2 4
59 1 74 2 1
60 2 76 2 2
61 2 69 2 1
62 1 74 2 2
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TE Donat Q2 Q3
13 15 3 4
4 5
7 4 5
11 5 5
13 4 5
«
11 4 3 5
14 10 4 5
12 4 5
11 5 4 5
14 8 4 5
14 26 3 5
11 10 3 5
5 5
9 2 4
3 5 4 5
12 3 4 3
13 11 5 5
9 1 3 5
12 6 4 5
12 2 5
;2 3
13 5 5
5 5
3 5
4
15
4
4
5
3
.
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No Sex Age AG Cond S A F H TE Donat 92 Q3
63 2 66 2 1 2 2 2 4 10 5 5
64 1 111 1 2 1 2 1 2 6 9. 4 5
65 2 100 1 2 4 2 2 4 12 4 5
66 2 89 1 2 2 2 4 15 5 5
67 1 93 1 1 2 2 3 5
68 1 96 1 2 4 1 3 4 12 10 4 3
69 2 95 1 1 3 2 2 4 11 6 5 5
70 1 99 1 2 4 1 2 2 9 4 3
71 1 76 2 1 4 4 3 4 15 3 5
72 2 74 2 2 4 2 2 4 12 1 5
73 2 68 2 2 1 5
74 2 68 2 1 2 3 5
75 2 77 2 1 2 2 4 12 1 5
76 1 102 1 1 4 2 2 4 12 2 3 5
77 1 90 1 1 3 3 9 4 5
78 2 91 1 2 4 4 2 4 14 4 5
79 2 74 2 2 5 5
80 2 75 2 1 2 4 3 9 1 5
81 2 102 1 1 2 2 3 7 5 1
82 2 95 1 1 4 2 4 4 14 2 5 5
83 1 93 1 2 2 1 1 4 8 12 5 5
84 1 89 1 2 3 3 3 4 13 21 4 5
85 1
•
77 2 2 2 4 2 4 12 3 5
86 2 75 2 1 2 4
87 1 72 2 2 4 1 1 4 10 2 5
88 2 71 2 2 4 3
89 1 69 2 1 3 4 3
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No Sex Age AG Cond S A F II TE Donat Q2 Q3
90 1 94 1 1 2 1 3 5 5
91 2 90 1 2 4 2 4 4 14 6 5 5
92 1 91 1 2 2 2 2 2 8 4 4
93 1 100 1 1 2 2 14 5 5
94 1 92 1 1 4 2 3 4 13 6 4 5
95 1 103 1 2 3 2 4 4 13 4 5
96 2 90 1 1 1 3 3 4 U 4 5
97 1 97 1 2 3 1 1 4 9 5 2
98 1 90 1 1 4 2 2 4 12 15 4 5
99 2 92 1 2 1 1 2 4 3 5
100 2 57 2 2 9 3 5
101 1 57 2 1 4 4 8 10 3 4
102 1 63 2 1 12 4 5
103 1 60 2 2 2 2 5
104 1 57
|
2 1 4 4 3 4 15 4 5
105 1 48 2 2 1 5
106 2 56 2 1 4 3 2 3 12 2 5
107 1 65 2 2 4 4 1 4 13 3 1 5
108 2 48 2 1 2 5
109 1 70 2 1 2 2 2 4 10 5 5
110 1 68 2 1 2 2 3 4 11 5 5
111 1 66 2 2 4 4 1 3 5
112 1 77 2 1 3 3 4 1 11 5 5
113 1 70 • 2 2 2 2 2 6 1 4
114 1 74 2 1 4 4 3 4 15 4 3 5
115 1 76 2 1 4 2 2 4 12 15 5 5
116 1 71 2 1 4 4 5 5
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No Sex Age Ag Cond S A F H TE Donat Q2 Q3
117 1 75 2 2 4 2 4 2 12 3 3
118 2 73 2 1 4 3 2 9 6 5 5
119 2 76 2 1 4 2 3 4 13 4 5
120 2 75 2 2 4 1 4 4 13 5 5
121 1 75 2 2 4 1 2 4 11 2 4 5
122 2 75 2 1 4 4 4 4 16 7 5 5
123 2 74 2 2 4 4 2 10 4 4 5
124 2 72 2 2 4 4 5 5
125 2 70 2 2 4 4 1 4 13 2 5 5
126 2 69 2 2 4 2 1 4 11 3 5
127 1 74 2 2 2 4 1 2 9 3 4 5
128 2 76 2 1 4 3 2 4 13 3 5
129 2 75 2 2 4 3 2 4 13 3 4
130 2 74 2 1 4 4 4 4 16 8 5 5
131 2 77 2 1 4 3 3 4 14 2 5 5
132 1 69 2 2 3 4 1 4 12 4 5
133 2 71 2 2 4 3 2 4 13 6 5 5
134 2 67 2 2 1 5 4
135 2 70 2 1 4 3 1 4 12 4 5
136 2 78 2 2 4 2 2 2 10 1 5
137 2 72 2 1 1 4 5 4 5
138 2 73 2 1 1 1 2 4 4
139 2 72 2 2 2 2 2 4 10 5 5
140 1 53 2 1 2 3 2 4 11 1 5
141 2 61 2 2 3 3 4 10 2 1 5
142 1 53 2 2 4 4 2 4 14 1 5
88
No Sex Age AG Cond S A F H TE Donat Q2 Q3
143 1 57 2 1 4 2 4 10 8 5 5
144 1 53 2 2 2 2 2 2 8 1 5
145 2 65 2 1 4 3 3 4 14 4 5 5
146 2 57 2 1 3 1 3 7 20 4 5
147 2 64 2 1 1 1 1 3 4 4
148 1 46 2 2 15 1 1
149 2 57 2 2 1 1 5
150 1 56 2 1 1 1 8 5 5
151 2 57 2 1 1 1 2 2 6 5 5 5
152 2 46 2 2 2 1 4 7 1 4
153 2 50 2 2 30 3 5
154 1 51 2 2 2 2 4 8 20 1 5
155 1 52 2 2 1 2
156 1 52 2 1 1 1 1 5
157 2 62 2 1 4 2 1 4 11 5 5
158 1 59 2 1 3 3 3 4 13 9 3 5
159 1 52 2 2 2 2 4 3 5
160 2 45 2 2 1 2 3 15 1 5
161 2 48 2 1 8 1 5
162 1 59 2 1 2 2 18 1 5
163 2 62 2 1 3 3 2 4 5
164 1 48 2 2 1 1 1 4 5
165 1 48 2 1 1 5 1
166 2 49 2 2 4 4 1 5
167 2 53 2 2 2 3
168 1 59 2 2 4 1 5 2 1
89
No Sex Age AG Cond S A F H TE Donat Q2 Q3
169 1 46 2 1 2 3
170 2 hi 2 1 3 5
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Abstract
Arousal of Empathy and Subsequent Generosity in Young Children
Empathizing, or experiencing the emotions of another person, has
frequently been postulated as an important motivator of altruistic
acts. Although this assertion has been supported with adults (e.g.,
Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978), there have been no direct experimental
manipulations of empathy in young children. The present study ex-
plored the effect of eliciting empathic arousal on subsequent sharing
in young children previously assessed as either high or low on a
measure of dispositional empathy.
The Feshbach and Roe (1968) empathy measure was administered indi-
vidually to 85 boys and 76 girls enrolled in preschool through second-
grade classes in a town in northeastern Kansas. The sample was pre-
dominately Caucasian and from middle-class backgrounds. One month
following the empathy measure, each child played a simple game and
received 30 plastic tokens which were described as redeemable for
prizes upon completion of the study. The children were informed that
there were some boys and girls from another class who would not be
able to receive any prizes, but that they might share their tokens
with them if they wished. Children were randomly assigned to one of
two conditions in which they were either (1) encouraged to focus on
the feelings of the less fortunate others (utilizing an empathy-
arousal procedure previously used with adults [Stotland, 1969]), or
(2) encouraged to think about the less fortunate others, but with no
mention of feelings being made. Each child was then given an oppor-
tunity to donate some prize tokens, in private, to the other children.
The children in the empathy-arousal condition (1) reported feel-
ing significantly sadder and (2) donated significantly more prize
tokens than children in the no empathy-arousal condition. No main or
interaction effects of dispositional empathy were found. In addition,
a main effect of age level was found for both donations and affect.
The results suggest that focusing the young child specifically
upon the feelings of needy others may enhance the expression of
charitable behaviors. Moreover, the encouragement of empathy may
have a favorable influence on young children at differing levels of
dispositional empathy. Implications for childrearing and discipline
techniques which may promote the development of prosocial behaviors
were discussed.
